Private Equity Investment in Financial Institutions and How to Avoid Becoming a Bank Holding Company by Desai, Ravi R.
NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 19
2009
Private Equity Investment in Financial Institutions
and How to Avoid Becoming a Bank Holding
Company
Ravi R. Desai
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ravi R. Desai, Private Equity Investment in Financial Institutions and How to Avoid Becoming a Bank Holding Company, 13 N.C. Banking
Inst. 385 (2009).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol13/iss1/19
Private Equity Investment in Financial Institutions and How to
Avoid Becoming a Bank Holding Company
I. INTRODUCTION
Wachovia, Washington Mutual, IndyMac... Which bank
will the credit crisis claim next? Could your bank face a similar
fate as these and many other banks that underwent a forced sale or
closure in 2008?1 As bank investments are written down, loan
charge-offs are increasing and repeated losses are eroding bank
capital, banks are being forced to raise additional capital or look
for a buyer.2  Regulators require that banks be adequately
capitalized so that they can absorb the potential losses that come
from bad investments.' The problem is that sources of additional
capital have become scarce.4 There are two primary explanations
for this: one, with so many banks in such a dire position, banks are
unable to borrow from each other, and two, the early round
investors have grown reluctant.5
Congress responded to the need for a capital infusion into
the financial system on October 3, 2008 with the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008.6 The EESA
authorizes the government to invest in the preferred stock of
banks and bank holding companies.7 Furthermore, in an effort to
1. FDIC: Bank Failures & Assistance, http://www.fdic.gov/BANK/HISTORIC
AL/BANK/index.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (25 banks have failed in 2008,
updated through December 12, 2008).
2. See, e.g., Michael Sisk, Banking's Private Equity Conundrum, U.S. BANKER,
Aug. 2008, at 16; Andy Stern, Keep Private Equity Away From Our Banks, WALL ST.
J., July 7, 2008, at A13.
3. George Hanc, The Future of Banking in America, 16 FDIC BANKING REVIEW
1, at 1, 17 (2004) (summary of the 16 papers that constitute the future of banking
study commissioned by the FDIC).
4. See, e.g., World on the Edge, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2008, available at http://
www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12341996; Sisk, supra note 2.
5. World on the Edge, supra note 4; Sisk, supra note 2.
6. See generally Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424,
110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008) (The EESA provides up to $700 billion to the Treasury
Secretary to purchase the bad mortgages and other assets of banks).
7. See id. at § 113(d)(1).
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attract greater private equity investment in banks, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve (Board) has issued a new Policy
Statement.8 The Policy Statement provides greater clarity and
guidance for investors on the limits of investing in a bank without
exerting a "controlling influence" over the bank and being
subjected to regulation as a bank holding company.9
Some banks, such as Bank of America and Wells Fargo,
have been successful in raising additional capital, but investment-
related write downs continue to grow and with it the need for
additional funds.10 Sovereign wealth funds," pension funds, and
other institutional investors that were once a source of capital
infusion are reluctant to commit additional funds to an industry
mired in a crisis that seems to be continuing. 12 As a result, private
equity firms are one of the only remaining large sources of
capital." Private equity firms have traditionally sought to buy or
gain a controlling investment in struggling or undervalued
companies, "fix them, grow them, and sell them" within a three- to
five-year period. 4 Holding periods can occasionally be as long as
ten-years, but the ultimate goal for private equity investors is
always to sell the company for a profit. 5 Private equity firms are
able to achieve quick turnarounds because management takes on
an ownership mentality and prefers to operate in industries with
8. See infra Part II.D.
9. See id.
10. Sisk, supra note 2; see infra notes 174-176 and accompanying text.
11. A sovereign wealth fund is "a government investment vehicle which is funded
by foreign exchange assets, and which manages those assets separately from the
official reserves of the monetary authorities (the Central Bank and reserve-related
functions of the Finance Ministry)." U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES, APPENDIX III: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (June
2007), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/economic-
exchange-rates/pdf/2007_Appendix-3.pdf.
12. See Vernon Hill, Fed to Ease Restrictions on Private Equity Investments in
Banks? It's About Time, SEEKING ALPHA, July 1, 2008, http://seekingalpha.com/
article/83381-fed-to-ease-restrictions-on-private-equity-investments-in-banks-it-s-
about-time; Sisk, supra note 2.
13. Sisk, supra note 2.
14. Geoffrey Colvin & Ram Charan, Private Lives, FORTUNE, Nov. 27, 2006,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2006/11/27/839444/index.
htm.
15. Id. (Some investments are less than a year.).
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fewer regulatory restraints than banking. 16 Additionally, private
equity firms seek to take advantage of "tax loopholes" to extract
large profits, which are primarily gained by taking risky positions
and operating around "lax regulation."' 7
As an aggregate, private equity funds are estimated to have
over $450 billion in capital ready to invest. 8 Private equity firms
have, to a large extent, remained on the sidelines regarding
investments in banks due to the Bank Holding Company Act
(BHCA), which is the federal statute that regulates a non-banking
entity seeking to gain "control" over a bank or bank holding
company. 9 Acquiring control of a bank requires a private equity
firm to register as a bank holding company.' ° Designation as a
bank holding company necessitates significant amount of federal
oversight and regulation. 21 For instance, bank holding companies
are limited to engaging only in activities closely related to122
banking. If a bank holding company also qualifies as a financial
holding company it is limited to activities that are financial in
nature.23 The purpose of requiring an investor to register as a bank
holding company is to prevent the investor from being
substantially involved in non-banking activities that might
undermine the capitalization and soundness of a bank.24
Therefore, private equity firms, which have traditionally engaged
in a host of non-banking and non-financial activities, find it
difficult to become a bank holding company and still maintain
their other investments.25
Private equity firms prefer to operate away from the public
and have historically found entering the banking industry to be
16. Id. ("Not only is a far larger share of executive pay tied to the performance of
an executive's business, but top managers may also be required to put a major chunk
of their own money into the deal.").
17. Stern, supra note 2.
18. Loan Rangers, ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2008 (LexisNexis).
19. Sisk, supra note 2.
20. See Bank Holding Co. Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (2006).
21. See infra notes 43-57 and accompanying text.
22. Bank Holding Co. Act, 12 C.F.R. § 225.21 (2008).
23. Id.
24. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (2008).
25. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.21.
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overly burdensome." Private equity firms are turned off by the
disclosure requirements and limitations on banking and non-
banking activities imposed by the Board, which is the chief
22
reglatr o bnk oldngcompanies. Furthermore, the Board
who requires banks to maintain an adequate capital balance.28
Bank holding companies are also required to act as a source of
financial and managerial strength for the banks they own, and so
they must be ready to infuse capital when a bank's capitalization
becomes inadequate." For which, private equity firms are neither
structured nor willing to necessarily provide an endless supply of
financial support like bank holding companies.0
Recently, there has been a shift in private equity behavior
as private equity firms view the current economic downturn in the
banking industry as an opportunity to gain large stakes in financial
institutions at bargain prices.31 The recent downfall of large
financial institutions represents a perfect opportunity for private
equity firms to turnaround undervalued banks and sell them for a
profit.32  The September 2008 Policy Statement issued by the
Board, therefore, is a welcome step forward for private equity
investors.
Part II of this Note will discuss the federal statutes and
Policy Statements issued by the Board that limits private equity
investment in banks.33 Part III will put forth the options available
to private equity firms for investing in banks along with specific
examples of ways private equity firms have been able to work
around the Board's current rules.34 Part IV will weigh the
26. See Colvin & Charan, supra note 14 (private equity firms like to be able to act
quickly and free from regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley and others); see also Stern,
supra note 2 (stating "private-equity firms operate in secret, virtually free from
regulation").
27. Sisk, supra note 2; Stern, supra note 2.
28. 12 C.F.R. § 225 app. A; 12 C.F.R. § 225 app. B.
29. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4.
30. See WILLIAM SATCHELL, ILAN S. NISSAN, JARED SPITALNICK & ADAM HYATr,
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, PRIVATE EQUITY FUND AND HEDGE FUND INV. IN THE
FIN. SERV. INDUS. (May 5, 2008), http://www.omm.com/newsroom/publication.aspx?
pub=621 [hereinafter O'Melveny & Myers].
31. See Loan Rangers, supra note 18.
32. See id.; Colvin & Charan, supra note 14 (private equity firms specialize in
turning around undervalued companies).
33. See infra Part II and accompanying text.
34. See infra Part III and accompanying text.
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advantages and disadvantages of allowing greater private equity
investment in banks.35 Part V will summarize the state of private
equity investment in banks and what issues remain unresolved.36
II. FEDERAL STATUTES AND POLICIES
There are two federal statutes that are intended to regulate
the control of banks.37 One is the BHCA of 1956 and the other is
the Change in Bank Control Act (CIBCA). The BHCA defines a
bank holding company as "any company which has control over
any bank. 38 According to the BHCA, "control" is established
whenever a company acquires an ownership interest of greater
than 25% of any class of voting stock of a bank or bank holding
company.3 9 The CIBCA, similar to the BHCA, defines "control"
by an investor as acquiring 25% or more of any class of voting
stock.40 The two definitions of "control" slightly differ in that the
BHCA also states that "control" exists when the "company
directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the
management or policies of the bank," whereas the CIBCA
requires the investor to "direct the management or policies."4
The primary differences between the two statutes are that the
CIBCA applies to individual investors who do not fall within the
definition of a "company" under the BHCA, and for acquired
depository institutions that do not fall within the definition of a
42
"bank" under the BHCA.
A. Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA)
The BHCA of 1956 set specific criteria for determining
when a company has gained "control" over a bank. "Control"
exists when a company, directly or indirectly, or through others,
35. See infra Part IV and accompanying text.
36. See infra Part V and accompanying text.
37. Sisk, supra note 2.
38. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A).
40. Change in Bank Control Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(8)(B).
41. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(8)(B); 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(C).
42. 12 U.S.C. § 18170) (2006); 12 U.S.C. § 1841.
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owns or controls 25% or more of any class of voting stock of a
bank.4 3 "Control" also exists when the "company controls in any
manner the election of a majority of the directors or trustees of the
bank." 44 Additionally, the Board can determine independently,
after notice and opportunity for hearing, whether the company
directly or indirectly has a "controlling influence" over the bank's
management or policies.4 Alternatively, "a company may not be
held to have had control over any given bank" when the
investment is limited to less than 5% of the voting stock.46 Only
investors that trigger one of the above control elements are
required to register as a bank holding company, file for approval
of the Board, and be regulated thereafter as a bank holding
47
company.
Being classified as a bank holding company subjects a
company to a great deal of oversight and ongoing requirements.
48
The BHCA requires investors to meet certain managerial and
capital requirements in order to maintain status as a bank holding
company.49 Furthermore, a bank holding company is subject to
continued Board supervision, examination, and regulation,5°
restrictions on direct and indirect activities and investments,51
standing as a "source of strength" for the bank and its
subsidiaries,52 and limitations on its ability to use leverage in
support of company activities.53 Of particular concern to private
43. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see also Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining The U.S. Regulatory
Framework For Assessing Sovereign Investments: Hearing of the Senate Banking
Comm., 110th Cong. 7 (2008) [hereinafter Hearing of the Senate Banking Comm.]
(statements of Scott Alvarez, General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System).
47. See Private Equity Investment in Banking Institutions, Fin. Serv. Alert
(Goodwin Procter), May 27, 2008, available at http:II http://www.goodwinprocter.
com-/media/B57387702B3C46BD995011C58CCOD90D.ashx [hereinafter Goodwin
Procter].
48. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.
49. Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
50. 12 C.F.R. § 225.5.
51. See 12 C.F.R. § 225 (Subpt. C 2008) ("Nonbanking activities and acquisitions
by bank holding companies").
52. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4.
53. See id. (the BHCA requires that when a bank holding company, with
consolidated assets of $500 million or more, seeks to purchase or redeem its own
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equity firms is the limitation on non-banking activities and
investments. 4 These restrictions substantially limit the industries
and sectors private equity firms are allowed to invest in.5" The
other major concern for private equity firms is that a bank holding
company must act as a "source of strength" for the bank, and is
vulnerable to all of the liabilities that the bank may encounter.5 6
These liabilities are not solely restricted to the immediate investor,
as parent entities that are directly or indirectly in control of the
investor may also be liable.57
B. Change in Bank Control Act (CIBCA)
The second piece of legislation that seeks to regulate the
control of financial institutions by non-regulated entities is the
CIBCA.58  Investors that do not meet the standards of a
"company" or "bank" under the BHCA may nevertheless be
subject to the CIBCA. 9 The CIBCA applies to any individual or
individuals, acting in concert, that acquire control of a bank or
where there is a change of control of a bank.6 ° The "control"
thresholds under the CIBCA are when the investor: (i) directly or
indirectly, oversees the management or policies of an insured
depository institution, or (ii) owns 25% or more of any class of
voting stock of the insured depository institution.6' Since an
investor that directs the management or policies of a bank is
considered to be in "control," the CIBCA will generally apply
anytime there is an acquisition of 10% or more of any class of
voting stock of a bank in the United States.
62
The CIBCA establishes a set of factors that must be
reviewed before an investor can gain approval from a federal
securities the notice it files must include leverage ratio calculations for the bank
holding company as of the most recent quarter); Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
54. 12 C.F.R. § 225.
55. Id.
56. See Hill, supra note 12.
57. See Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
58. 12 U.S.C. § 18170).
59. See id.; Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
60. 12 U.S.C. § 18170).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(8)(B).
62. Hearing of the Senate Banking Comm., supra note 46, at 8.
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agency to acquire a controlling position in a bank.63 These factors
"focus on the competitive effects of the proposal, the managerial
competence[,] experience, integrity and financial strength of the
acquirer, certain informational requirements, and whether the
transaction would result in an adverse effect on the deposit
insurance funds." 64 The CIBCA does not impose any activity
limitations or ongoing supervisory requirements like the BHCA.65
C. Application of the BHCA
Under the BHCA, investments of up to 24.9% are allowed
in any class of voting stock of a bank without finding the investor
to be in "control" of the bank.66 In reality though, the Board looks
to restrict ownership positions in banks to less than 15%, voting
and nonvoting stock combined, and limits ownership stakes further
67to less than 10% when an investor seeks to appoint a director.
The Board has a general distaste for allowing investors, such as
private equity firms, to have board representation because of the
fear that they will exert too much control or influence over the
bank.6' The concern is that if unregulated investors are allowed to
meddle with management policies, then this will lead to unsound
banking practices. 69 Furthermore, when the Board is determining
whether an investor has surpassed a certain ownership percentage
threshold, it will consider nonvoting stock that is convertible to
voting stock to have already been converted.7 ° This prevents
investors from bypassing the regulations of the BHCA and later
gaining control.
The Board's first Policy Statement, issued in 1982, on
nonvoting equity investments by bank holding companies provides
63. 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(7); Hearing of the Senate Banking Comm., supra note 46,
at 8.
64. 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(7); Hearing of the Senate Banking Comm., supra note 46,
at 8.
65. Hearing of the Senate Banking Comm., supra note 46, at 8.
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a).
67. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144; Oliver Sarkozy & Randal Quarles, Private Equity Can
Save the Banks, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2008, at A15.
68. See Sisk, supra note 2.
69. See Stern, supra note 2.
70. O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 30.
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guidance on the policies the Board considers when determining
whether an investor is attempting to exert a "controlling
influence" over a bank's management or policies.71 In the 1982
Policy Statement, the Board noted specific arrangements investors
were creating, in order to protect their investments, as being
inconsistent with the control provisions of the BHCA. These
arrangements include covenants or options that, among other
things, allow investors to prevent takeovers by others, limit the
discretion of the bank's management over major policies and
decisions, and reserve the right for investors to sell their options,
warrants, and rights to a person of their choice.73 The Board,
however, also included guidance on provisions that could be
incorporated to avoid control.74 These provisions include allowing
''management [to be] free to conduct all banking and permissible
nonbanking activities," granting banks a right of first refusal when
an investor seeks to dispose of his investment, and limiting the
amount of voting and nonvoting stock acquired by an investor so
as to avoid owning a controlling percentage of the bank's total
equity.
Also in the 1982 Policy Statement, "the Board recognizes
that the complexity of legitimate business arrangements precludes
rigid rules designed to cover all situations and that decisions
regarding the existence or absence of control ... must take into
account ... [the] provisions . . . and circumstances of each case. 76
Since each case is unique, investors with less than a 25% voting
interest in a bank and who are considered to have a "controlling
influence" are given an opportunity to rebut the claim and thus
avoid becoming a bank holding company.77 A rebuttal of control
will typically require the investor to enter into some form of
agreement with the banking regulator, whereby the investor agrees
to remain "passive., 78  Such an agreement usually calls for
71. 12 C.F.R. § 225.143.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 12 C.F.R. § 225.143. See Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
78. See Goodwin Procter, supra note 47 (The passivity agreements are consistent
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commitments such as "not to seek to exercise a controlling
influence over the management or policies" of the bank, and "not
to seek or accept representation on the board of directors" of the
bank.79 These passivity commitments seek to ease the worries that
the Board has about banking operations being dominated by
unregulated investors.
There are two standard passive investment agreement
forms, the Lincoln and Crown X, which the Board issues to
prevent an investor from exerting a "controlling influence" over
the target bank.8 ° The target bank is the bank in which the
investor seeks to make an investment. The rules attached to these
passive agreement forms run counter to the way private equity
firms normally operate. The more stock a private equity firm
owns, the more control they want over the company's operational
policies, which often includes board representation; however,
under the Lincoln and Crown X commitments the Board is
unwilling to give such "controlling influence."'"
The Lincoln commitment applies to those investors seeking
to acquire between 10% and 14.9% of any class of bank voting
stock and who will not, thereafter, be the largest shareholder of
the target bank.82  The Lincoln commitment will not allow the
investor to have more than one representative on the target's
board of directors. 8' Furthermore, the commitment requires that
this board position be terminated if the investor ever becomes the
largest shareholder of the target or acquires more than 15% of the
voting stock.84 Moreover, the Lincoln commitment will not let an
investor: appoint employees to serve in the management of the
bank or its subsidiaries; take action that would cause the bank to
with the guidance provided in 12 C.F.R. § 225.143(d) - Provisions that Avoid
Control).
79. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144; Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
80. Federal Reserve Considering Flexibility for Private Equity Bank Investments,
Legal Alert (Sutherland), July 2, 2008, available at http://www.sutherland.com/files/
News/9c168402-6bOf-459b-64e3fa93d5f2d43/Presentation/NewsAttachment/ae9c4787-
c3de-496f-afcf-012626a73e2/LegalAlertCorpPrivateEquityBanklnvestments72208.pdf
[hereinafter Sutherland].
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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become a subsidiary of the investor's company; acquire a
combined interest between investors, directors and officers of 25%
or more; propose a director in opposition to one proposed by
management or the board of directors; solicit proxies; attempt to
influence the operational policies of the bank; dispose or threaten
to dispose of stock in retaliation to some action or nonaction taken
by the bank; or, engage in transactions with the bank besides
maintaining a deposit of up to $500,000 in the bank.85
The Crown X commitment applies to those investors
seeking to acquire between 10% and 24.9% of any class of bank
voting stock.86 For those investments between 10% and 14.9%, the
determining factor between the use of the Lincoln and the Crown
X commitment will be whether the investor would be the largest
single shareholder.87 If the investor will be the largest shareholder
than the Crown X commitment must be used.88 The provisions of
the Crown X commitment are identical to those of the Lincoln
commitment except that the Crown X commitment does not allow
for an investor to have any representation on the board of
directors of the bank.89
D. Board Issues New Policy Statemint
The Board released a new Policy Statement in September
2008, which eases the ability of investors to make non-controlling
equity investments in banks under the BHCA.9° The changes are
particularly advantageous for private equity investors. 9
Representation on the board of directors is an issue the Board has
85. Id.
86. Sutherland, supra note 80.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.144 (The Board's September 22, 2008 Policy Statement on
equity investments in banks and bank holding companies is the first on the topic since
it's 1982 Policy Statement on nonvoting equity investments by bank holding
companies).
91. Financial Reserve Board Policy Statement on Equity Investments in Banks and
Bank Holding Companies, Fin. Serv. Regulatory & Enforcement Update (Mayer
Brown), Sept. 24, 2008, available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/Financialservices
regulatoryandenforcement/publications/article.asp?id=5607&nid=706 [hereinafter
Mayer Brown].
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changed its stance on, as it now believes that passive investors
should be able to have a single representative on the board.92 The
Board believes that because banking organizations typically have a
nine to ten member board of directors, it would be difficult for a
minority investor with only one representative to exert a
"controlling influence" over the management or policies of the
bank.93 The new Policy Statement actually allows investors to have
up to two representatives on the board, as long as the number of
directors is proportionate to the investor's interest in the bank.94
An investor's board appointees, however, cannot exceed 25% of
the voting members of the board; in order to have two board seats,
the bank must be controlled by another shareholder who is
registered as a bank holding company. 9 The Board believes that
the presence of a controlling shareholder (the bank holding
company) that is subject to Board supervision and regulation is a
powerful enough force to counter the influence of any minority
investor.96  Board representatives that serve on behalf of the
unregulated investor may not serve as chairman of the board or as
a chairman of a committee of the board.97 Furthermore, a private
equity firm's representatives are free to serve on a committee so
long as they do not represent more than 25% of the committee
and "do not have the authority or practical ability unilaterally to
make (or block the making of) policy or other decisions that bind
the board or management of the banking organization." 98
Formerly, the Board provided little guidance regarding
communications with management.99 The general attitude was
that only limited communication between investors and banks was
allowed because the Board did not want unregulated investors to
influence bank policies.1°° The 2008 Policy Statement now openly
allows investors to communicate with management regarding bank
92. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144.
99. Mayer Brown, supra note 91.
100. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.144; Mayer Brown, supra note 91.
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policies and operations. 1 Investors may voice their opinion about
the bank's dividend policy, discussions about raising additional
debt or equity, entering or terminating new lines of business,
mergers and acquisitions, or the general role of management.
'02
The ultimate decision making power still rests with the bank's
shareholders, board of directors, or management.1 ° The Board
does not believe that discussions with management are the type of
"controlling influence" the BHCA sought to prevent. Even by
allowing discussions, the minority investor's role in the ultimate
decisions of the bank is limited to the investor's voting stock and
board representation.05
The Board has long believed that the overall size of the
equity investment in a bank is an important indicator of the level
of influence an investor has. 1°6 Previously, the Board's general
position was that nonvoting securities representing 25% or more
of a bank's equity would raise "control" issues.0 7 Acquisitions of
25% or more of any voting security are automatically "control"
investments.' ° The new Policy Statement gives an investor the
ability to acquire up to a 33% equity interest in a bank without
triggering any assumption of control as long as the one-third
equity interest is divided between voting and nonvoting stock and
the investor holds no more than 15% of any class of voting
securities.' 9 The Board continues to believe that an investor that
makes a large equity investment is likely to exert a "controlling
influence" over the bank's management or policies, but recognizes
that a substantial ownership of nonvoting stock hinders an
investor's ability to directly participate in the bank's management
or policies."0 Therefore, it remains that an investor with an
ownership interest of 25% or more, in voting and nonvoting stock
101. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144.
108. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2).
109. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144 (assuming conversion of all convertible nonvoting shares
held by the investor).
110. Id.
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combined, has the ability to have a "controlling influence" over
the management and policies of the bank."'
III. OPTIONS FOR INVESTING IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
As private equity firms become increasingly interested in
investing in banks, they continue looking for ways to navigate
around the BHCA to avoid registration as a bank holding112
company. There are a number of options available for private
equity firms to structure their investments so that they can avoid
exercising a "controlling influence" over banks and are not
subjected to regulation as a bank holding company.'13 If private
equity firms find none of these investment structures viable, then
their only option to invest in banks remains to register as a bank
holding company.
A. Limited Voting Stock and Passivity Commitments
Since investments of 25% or more of voting securities are
automatically treated as "controlling," private equity firms seeking
to invest in the banking industry should look to make smaller,moredivese " • .114
more diverse investments. Typically, regulators have not
worried about acquisitions of less than 10% of the voting stock of
a bank, a sort of de facto safe harbor. "5 The belief is that investors
of this size would have a difficult time exerting a "controlling
influence" over the bank's management or policies.
Consequentially, private equity firms must limit their
voting interest to 9.9%.116 Or, in an effort to maximize their
investment, by taking an ownership interest of between ten and
25% of voting stock, they can enter into passivity agreements to
111. Id.
112. See Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
113. See id.; Thomas P. Vartanian, THE NEW RULES OF PRIVATE EQUITY
INVESTMENTS & ACQUISITIONS IN U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (ABA Section of
Business Law: Banking Law Committee Journal, Chicago, Ill.), Sept. 2007, http://
www.abanet.org/buslaw/newsletter/0062/materials/pp2.pdf.
114. Goodwin Procter, supra note 47. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a).
115. Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
116. Id.
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avoid triggering the requirements of the BHCA.'17 Agreements
such as the Lincoln or Crown X commitments are specifically
designed to negate control and ensure that the investor remains
passive.118 The problem previously had been that these passivity
agreements were too restrictive and ran counter to the business
practices of most private equity firms. The Board's recent Policy
Statement though no longer requires such strict passivity
agreements, as the Board recognizes that limited board
representation, voting interests, and discussions with management
are not as threatening as previously thought." 9 Limiting the
percentage of voting stock and entering into passivity agreements
is the most immediate solution available to private equity firms
that wish to invest in banks.
The private equity firm TPG led a $7 billion investment in
Washington Mutual Inc. in April 2008, in which TPG committed
$1.35 billion of its own capital.12° TPG limited its investment to a
9% ownership interest in Washington Mutual. 21  Due to this
arrangement, TPG was able to take a seat on Washington Mutual's
122Board of Directors. Later in that same month, a similar
structure was used when private equity firm Corsair Capital
committed $985 million of a $7 billion capital infusion into
National City.123 After the transaction Corsair Capital maintained
exactly a 9.9% investment interest in National City. 1
4
B. Investments in Nonvoting Stock
Another option, for private equity firms wishing to avoid
''control" is to acquire nonvoting securities as a portion of their
117. See id.
118. See Sutherland, supra note 80.
119. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.144.
120. Peter Lattman, WaMu Fall Crushes TPG, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2008, at Bi;
Colin Barr, The Smart Money Saves WaMu, FORTUNE, Apr. 8, 2008, http://money.
cnn.com/2008/04/08/news/wamu-privateequity.fortune/index.htm.
121. Lattman, supra note 120.
122. Id.
123. Ruthie Ackerman, Corsair Jumps Aboard National City, FORBES, Apr. 21,
2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/04/21/nationalcity-bank-update-markets-equity-
cx ra_0421markets2l.html.
124. Robin Sidel, David Enrich & Peter Lattman, NatCity Close To $6 Billion
Cash Infusion, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2008, at C1.
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investment."' Nonvoting securities may include preferred stock,
convertible debt, warrants and options, or other subordinated
securities."' By acquiring a portion of their investment as
preferred stock, private equity firms would be able to avoid bank
holding company status so long as the stock: (i) does not allow the
investment company to vote for or influence the selection of the
bank's board of directors; (ii) constitutes a passive investment or
financing device that does not allow for the investor to control the
bank's management or policies; and (iii) limits voting rights to
those afforded by state law to shareholders whose rights have been
adversely affected.127
Private equity firms must be careful when dealing with
nonvoting securities that are convertible into voting stock. The
Board will look to see how quickly those securities are convertible
and whether or not the firm is taking on an overweighing balance
of the risk associated with the voting stock.2 8 Nonvoting securities
that are convertible into voting stocks are considered to have
already been converted for banking law purposes, since the
conversion is usually a significant reason for the investment.
129
Under the guidance of the 2008 Policy Statement issued by
the Board, private equity firms are capable of acquiring up to a
33% equity interest in banks through a combination of voting
securities, nonvoting securities, and convertible securities. 3 '
Private equity firms that seek ownership up to this limit are
restricted from owning 15% or more of any class of voting stock,
including any convertible stock. 31 The balance of the ownership
equity must come in the form of nonvoting stock.32 The Board
favors this structure because "the limitation on voting rights
reduces the potential that the investor may exercise influence that
is controlling.'
' 3
125. Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
126. Vartanian, supra note 113; Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
127. Vartanian, supra note 113; Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
128. Vartanian, supra note 113; Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
129. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144. See also Vartanian, supra note 113; O'Melveny & Myers,
supra note 30.
130. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144. See also Vartanian, supra note 113.
131. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144.
132. See id.
133. Id.
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C. Consortium of Private Equity Investors
Private equity firms seeking to avoid "control" or unwilling
to make large individual investments may, alternatively, pool a
group of individual investors together. Forming a consortium of
investors to invest in a bank is tricky because the individual
interest of investors is often aggregated under the presumption
that they are acting "in concert., 134 Even if no single investment
triggers an assumption of "control," the overall investment may
put the consortium over the threshold limit if the investors are
found to be acting "in concert." '135 Typically, investors are found to
be acting "in concert" when they consciously exhibit the same
pattern of behavior with regard to the control of the voting
securities of the bank.'36 When such behavior is present, for
control purposes, the different investors are presumed to be acting
as one unit and are, therefore, subject to the bank holding
company requirements of the BHCA.137 If the investors do not
complete the appropriate "control" filings required for Board
approval, then the Board or other bank regulators can call for a
divestiture of the investment or take other remedial actions in
addition to the imposition of fines.138
There are a number of ways to structure investments so as
to avoid the aggregation of multiple investors, but the most crucial
factor is to establish a significant amount of separation and
independence between the various investors.3 9 Individuals that
would have normally invested as one group or private equity fund
may form multiple, separate entities or trusts to control the
investment. 140 They may also enter into passivity agreements to
141
avoid triggering bank holding company requirements.
134. Vartanian, supra note 113; Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
135. See Vartanian, supra note 113.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Vartanian, supra note 113.
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Additionally, these separate entities must reassure regulators that
they do not plan to act "in concert.'
14 2
The 2008 Policy Statement issued by the Board does not
address how it would treat an investment by a consortium of
investors. However, there have, in the past, been successful
investments in large banks by a consortium of private equity
investors without any of them being deemed to have acquired
control over the bank as an aggregate or individually.'43 One of the
largest such deals was the recapitalization of Doral Financial
Corporation (Doral).'4 In the Doral deal, Bear Stearns, Goldman
Sachs, and other equity investors pooled together to each acquire
less than 10% of the voting stock of the investment entity, Doral
Holdings, which acquired Doral. 4' The equity investors also
entered into passivity agreements and made representations of
their independence from the other investors. 46 Since Doral
Holdings was a bank holding company subject to oversight by the
Board, it was able to purchase 90% of Doral 47  Additionally,
several of the equity investors were able to designate one
representative on behalf Doral Holdings to be on the board of
Doral.48
D. Bank Focused Private Equity Funds
Private equity firms can create entirely new investment
vehicles focused solely on banks.149 This investment structure is
commonly referred to as the "silo" approach, which seeks to keep
the general partnership of the private equity firm at arms length
from the bank investment.5 These "silo" funds can actually be
142. See id.
143. See Vartanian, supra note 113; Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
144. Vartanian, supra note 113; Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
145. R. Christian Bruce, Bear Stearns Bid for Doral Financial Shows Private
Equity Firms Eyeing Banks, BANKING DAILY, May 21, 2007; Goodwin Procter, supra
note 47.
146. Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
147. Bruce, supra note 145.
148. Vartanian, supra note 113.
149. Kelly Holman & Aleksandrs Rozens, The New Old Bank, INV. DEALERS'
DIGEST, Oct. 6, 2008, at 18; Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
150. Holman & Rozens, supra note 149.
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structured as bank holding companies, therefore, allowing for
investments of greater than 25% of voting securities or 33% of
total equity.15' By creating an entirely separate fund, private
equity firms limit their overall exposure from the oversight and
regulations associated with being a bank holding company.1
5 2
Portfolio holdings outside of the "silo" fund, created solely for
banking purposes, are not affected by the "silo" fund's bank
holding company status.' This structure is particularly
advantageous because it eases the concern that many private
equity firms have about being restricted from investing in a diverse
set of industries, and that their other holdings may be required to
be a "source of strength" for the bank.5 4 Without these concerns,
private equity firms are more inclined to acquire equity interests of
up to 33%.
Also, since the BHCA does not reach individuals, those
individuals that control the "silo" fund or its general partner are
not subject to the regulations of the BHCA, but would instead be
subject to notice requirements of the CIBCA."5 Therefore, the
individual investors can continue with their other private equity
investments and fund management so long as it takes place
separate from the "silo" bank fund.5 6 Essentially, what occurs is
private equity firm X will create multiple investment funds, one of
which will be solely dedicated to bank investments, and may or
may not be structured as a bank holding company. Fund I, the
designated bank fund, will therefore be the only investment
portfolio subject to the regulations of the BHCA. Funds II, III,
IV, and so on will not be affected by Fund I's status as a bank
holding company.
Although the Board's Policy Statement does not address
bank-focused private equity funds, the approach has been
successfully accomplished by the private equity firm JLL
Partners.'57 JLL Partners has put over $4 billion in capital to use in
151. See id.
152. See Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
153. See id.
154. 12 C.F.R. § 225 (Subpart C); 12 C.F.R. § 225.4.
155. See 12 C.F.R. § 225 (Subpart C); 12 C.F.R. § 225.4.
156. See 12 C.F.R. § 225 (Subpart C); 12 C.F.R. § 225.4.
157. See Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
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a variety of industries through a series of funds.158 Due to its
diverse set of holdings, JLL Partners had no intention of becoming
a bank holding company when it sought to acquire First
Community Bank (First Community) in Dallas, Texas.159 Instead,
JLL Partners created a separate fund, JLL Partners Fund FCH,
which was used to invest in a newly created bank holding company
that actually acquired over 60% of First Community 6° Because
JLL Partners has created this specific bank holding company fund,
none of the individual principals or any of JLL's other private
equity investments conducted outside of the fund are exposed to
the BHCA regulations.161 However, had JLL's "silo" fund been
controlled by a management organization rather than individual
principals all of the other funds or investments controlled by the
same management organization would also be subject to
regulation and supervision under the BHCA
1 62
In order to make sure that these funds are sufficiently
separate from one another, the Board focuses on inter-fund
relationships to make sure that the private equity firm's funds
maintain separate economies. 163 The Board looks to make sure
that there are "no common portfolio investments, no cross-
investment or lending among the funds, no asset transfers among
the funds, and no material economic linkages among the funds."'
64
It is important for private equity firms to make sure that none of
the actions above take place in order to avoid the unnecessary
regulation of their other portfolio holdings.
IV. PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT: GOOD OR BAD?
The Board and other bank and thrift regulators have many
fears about allowing private equity firms to invest in banks. One
of the goals of the BHCA was to create a "separation [between]
158. JLL Partners Company Description, http://www.hoovers.com/jll-partners/--
ID_114203--/free-co-profile.xhtml.
159. Holman & Rozens, supra note 149.
160. Id.; Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
161. See Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
162. See O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 30.
163. See Goodwin Procter, supra note 47.
164. Id.
165. See id.
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commerce and banking., 16 6  Banks must maintain a degree of
separation from other businesses because almost every business
and individual is tied to a bank in some form or fashion, whether it
is where they keep deposits or borrow money. As an integral part
to the free flow of commerce, banks should be monitored closely
so as to prevent the use of unsound banking practices that could
result in market failures.
167
Private equity investment poses a threat to the separation
of commerce and banking because private equity firms
traditionally invest in portfolio companies across a range of
industries. 6' Not only do private equity firms invest in a lot of
different industries, but they also seek "control" over their
investments in order to influence operations. 169 Therefore, the fear
is that private equity firms have too many varying interests. 70 This
could lead to a dangerous mix of banking and commercial interests
if private equity firms try to raise money at below market rates
through FDIC insured deposits to use for their other holdings.17'
The Board has specifically intended to limit such behavior.7
Additionally, the Board requires that a bank holding
company be a reliable source of financial and managerial strength,
and it is unclear whether a private equity firm could always
provide the financial support needed.'73 Typically, private equity
firms look to raise a set amount of capital for each fund, and once
that amount is raised, they put it to work by investing in a portfolio
of companies. 74 Since each fund is a separate legal entity the
capital available for investment is limited, and any new capital is
only raised once the investment phase of an existing fund is
completed. 7' The problem that arises is that if a private equity
166. O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 30.
167. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.144; O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 30.
168. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.144; O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 30.
169. See Sarkozy & Quarles, supra note 67; O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 30.
170. See O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 30.
171. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.144.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Stephen D. Prowse, The Economics of the Private Equity Market,
ECONOMIC REVIEW (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Dallas, Tex.), Third Quarter
1998, at 21, 28.
175. See id.
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fund invests in a bank, which experiences a need for additional
capital, there may be no excess capital for infusion because all of
the capital raised by the fund that made the investment in the bank
has already been put to work.176 Will private equity firms be able
to borrow from their other portfolio holdings and funds or will
they be forced to raise new rounds of capital? Will current
investors be put on the hook for additional amounts of capital or
will new investors have to be pursued? Private equity investors
will find it difficult to provide support for potentially unlimited
amounts of losses.177 No firm or investor wants to be responsible
for potentially endless amounts of financial support.78 Investors
buy into such funds in large part due to the diversified risk
potential and the ability to lose on one investment while gaining
on another.
Furthermore, there is an assumption that if private equity
firms were able to gain control of banks they would be more likely
to engage in the unsound banking practices regulators fear.179
Private equity firms are not typically long-term investors. 18 The
average life span for a given fund may be anywhere from less than
one year to more than ten years, depending on the firm and
investment objectives of that fund.181 Therefore, private equity
firms look to grow companies quickly and earn a large return in
the process.18 ' This is an investment strategy that is ripe for being
involved in the same kind of practices that landed banks in their
current predicament - making speculative and risky loans,
engaging in unfair lending practices, and charging higher fees and
higher interest rates on consumer products.1 83  The traditional
notions of private equity investments seem to run counter to the
long-term financial support the Board and other government
entities seek when looking for significant bank investors.
176. See id.
177. See Sarkozy & Quarles, supra note 67; O'Melveny & Myers, supra note 30.
178. See Loan Rangers, supra note 18.
179. See Stern, supra note 2.
180. Stern, supra note 2; Colvin & Charan, supra note 14.
181. Colvin & Charan, supra note 14.
182. See Stern, supra note 2.
183. Id.
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There are positive aspects, however, to private equity
investment in banks. Private equity firms offer a major source of
capital and are a group of investors that are ready to put their
money to work.'8 It is estimated that private equity firms have
almost $450 billion ready to invest.85 Fittingly, this is also a time
when banks are in need of additional capital due to their
deteriorating balance sheets as a result of failing loans and
investments. 18 Banks have already been forced to raise capital
through a variety of measures totaling $400 billion, but it is
estimated that they will have to raise billions more to compensate
for additional losses and to maintain adequate capital reserves.1 87
The problem is that the ability of banks to raise money on the
public markets is coming at an increasing cost, as banks have to
issue new stock at steep discounts to their current value.'8s Wells
Fargo was able to raise $11 billion, but at a 15% discount to the
closing price of the day before the offering was announced.9
Bank of America raised $10 billion at an 8% discount to the
closing price of the day before the offering was announced.' 9° The
federal government has responded with a bailout bill, the EESA,
which is intended to provide banks with some of the capital that
they so desperately need.' 9' The plan calls for the Treasury
Secretary to purchase up to $250 billion of preferred stock in
banks in an effort to keep money flowing through the financial
system. ' 9
The main purpose of the bailout is to restore the
confidence of private investors. 93 The current problem for banks
184. Sisk, supra note 2.
185. Loan Rangers, supra note 18.
186. Sisk, supra note 2; Holman & Rozens, supra note 149.
187. Sisk, supra note 2.
188. Marshall Eckblad & Lauren Pollock, Wells Fargo Raises $11 Billion in Stock
Offering, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122601502289406
799.html.
189. Id.
190. Bank of America raises $10B, WASHINGTON Bus. J., Oct. 8, 2008, http://
triangle.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/2008/10/06/daily44.html?q=bank % 20of%
20america%20raises%20$10B%20washington%20business%20journal.
191. Deborah Solomon, Damian Paletta, Jon Hilsenrath & Aaron Lucchetti, U.S.
to Buy Stakes in Nation's Largest Banks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2008, at Al.
192. Id.
193. See id.
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is that those investors that contributed during the early rounds of
capital-raising are no longer willing to sink greater amounts of
capital after seeing their investments plunge.194 Of the forty-two
public equity infusions into banks since mid-2007, thirty-nine
banks are trading below their issue price.9 The inability to go to
the capital markets and the unwillingness of sovereign funds,
pension funds, and other large institutional investors to invest has
left banks with very few options.196 Private equity firms, on the
other hand, are a group of investors that have the time, resources,
and capability to evaluate banks more critically and make
informed investment decisions.
197
Due to the current market dynamics, private equity firms
are a natural fit as bank investors. Private equity firms are capable
of bringing a lot of industry experience and knowledge to banks,
which is especially needed during a time when banks are
struggling.9 8 Private equity firms are savvy investors that look to
bring the best and brightest minds onto their management teams.'9 9
Experienced industry managers are often sought before a private
200
equity firm even chooses to invest in a company. Management,
in many cases, is required to invest its own money into the
transaction, creating an ownership mentality for management and
further tying compensation and pay to performance. 1 One of the
reasons why the TPG - Washington Mutual relationship did not
result in a fire-sale of Washington Mutual stock was because the
founder of TPG, David Bonderman, has a vast amount of industry
experience dating back to the savings and loan crisis of the late
1980s.202 Furthermore, if private equity firms cannot find the
expertise from within their organization, they have the money to
203buy and assemble a team as they progress.
194. Sisk, supra note 2.
195. Sarkozy & Quarles, supra note 67 (Figures are as of the time the article was
printed on June 26, 2008.).
196. Sisk, supra note 2.
197. See Sarkozy & Quarles, supra note 67.
198. See Barr, supra note 120.
199. See Colvin & Charan, supra note 14; Barr, supra note 120.
200. See Colvin & Charan, supra note 14.
201. Id.
202. Barr, supra note 120.
203. See Loan Rangers, supra note 18.
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V. CONCLUSION
As previously enforced, the BHCA was too restrictive to
allow for any meaningful investment by private equity firms in
banks. The Board's recent Policy Statement regarding equity
investments in banks and bank holding companies is a positive
step forward and serves as a proper median for allowing larger
204
equity investments. Under the BHCA, "control" exists when
there is an acquisition of 25% or more of any class of voting stock,
but in reality the Board finds a "controlling influence" any time
there is an acquisition of 15% or more of the voting stock of any
205
company. Under the 2008 Policy Statement, investors are still
permitted to own up to 24.9% of the voting stock without any
finding of a "controlling influence" over the bank.2 °6 The new
Policy Statement also provides guidance for equity investments of
up to 33% in a bank, but with the limitation that an investor's
voting stock interest be less than 15% in order to avoid exerting a
"controlling influence., 207 The new guidelines issued by the board
also allow investors up to two seats on the board of directors,
whereas previously board representation was limited to one seat
and only in cases where investments totaled less than 15%.28 The
Board further allows limited communication between minority
investors and bank management, which had previously been
strictly prohibited by passivity agreements. Due to these new
guidelines, passivity agreements will no longer need to be as strict
and unattractive as the Lincoln and Crown X commitments.
The new Policy Statement eases the fear and worries of
many private equity investors, but the rules are still stringent and
there is no great power conferred upon private equity investors.
The Policy Statement merely provides investors with a small voice
in the operations of a bank. Equity investments are still capped,
204. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.144; Mayer Brown, supra note 91.
205. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2); Sarkozy & Quarles, supra note 67.
206. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144.
207. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144; Mayer Brown, supra note 91.
208. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144.
209. Id.; Sutherland, supra note 80.
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board representation is still limited, and policy and operational
influence is restricted to discussion only.2""
Investing in banks is inherently risky. Consequentially,
private equity firms are going to be hesitant to make a substantial
investment in a company in which they must remain passive.
Washington Mutual's failure, which is the largest bank failure in
U.S. history, completely wiped out TPG's $1.35 billion equity
investment made just five months earlier."' Private equity firms
specialize in actively managing troubled companies, and with an
interest in protecting their investment, they will not take well to
being bystanders while others mismanage their holdings.12 They
look to take advantage of distressed companies by bringing in new
management and scaling the business for growth.
The Policy Statement fails to clarify the Board's position in
a few areas. The voting stock investment range in between 5%
and 25% remains grey since there is no strict criteria for
determining when "control" exists and each case must be judged
on its own facts and circumstances."4 The Board continues to
maintain that the determination of whether there is a "controlling
influence" will be based on a case-by-case analysis of the facts and
circumstances around the transaction.215 This allows the Board
greater flexibility, but it also discourages private equity investors
because there is no certainty as to what exactly will constitute a
"controlling influence" in investments of less than 25%.216
Furthermore, the Board must be consistent in its enforcement.
For example, the TPG - Washington Mutual deal was allowed
while the Corsair Capital - National City deal, as initially
proposed, was rejected by the Board even though a large part of
the language of that deal came from the TPG - Washington
210. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144; Holman & Rozens, supra note 149.
211. Robin Sidel, David Enrich & Dan Fitzpatrick, WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to
J.P. Morgan, In Largest Failure in U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008,
at Al (Washington Mutual was seized by the FDIC and subsequently sold to J.P.
Morgan for $1.9 billion plus write-downs associated with Washington Mutual's bad
loans).
212. See Colvin & Charan, supra note 14.
213. Id.
214. Loan Rangers, supra note 18.
215. 12 C.F.R. § 225.144; Mayer Brown, supra note 91; Sisk, supra note 2.
216. See Sisk, supra note 2; Mayer Brown, supra note 91.
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Mutual transaction. Specifically, the "reset" provision that the
Board was so afraid of in the Corsair deal was also a part of the
approved investment agreement between TPG and Washington
Mutual.21s
Another area where the Board is unclear is in regard to
equity investments between 25% and 33%. With investments of
less than 25%, investors are allowed to own up to an equal amount
of voting stock; however, when equity investments rise to 33%, the
voting stock must be limited to less than 15%.219 Does this mean
that equity investments of 25.1% are also limited to less than 15%
voting stock or only investments of 33%? Additionally, the Policy
Statement does not address its view on consortium investments or
bank-focused private equity funds.
There are a few things private equity firms are looking for
before they commit capital in their bid to save banks. Private
equity investors like to feel in charge by bringing in their own
220
management or by providing operational guidance themselves.
The Policy Statement does allow for greater board representation,
but it still relegates minority investor board representatives to a
221cursory role where they are able to effectuate little change.
Private equity investors are also looking for a more liberal stance
on when private equity firms are found to be acting "in concert.
222
Additionally, they would like to be able to "ring-fence" funds that
invest in banks so they can protect their other portfolio holdings
217. Sisk, supra note 2 (The Board was worried about National City's ability to
raise additional capital because of National City's promise to compensate Corsair for
any additional shares sold below Corsair's $5 a share investment). See Dan Freed,
Corsair's National City Deal Concerns Fed, THESTREET.COM, July 9, 2008, http://
www.thestreet.com/story/10425398/1/corsairs-national-city-deal-concerns-fed.html.
218. Freed, supra note 217 (A "reset" provision "enable[s] investors to claw back
some of their investment in the event that the financial institution raises further
equity... at a share price below the original investment." The Board's concern with
such provisions is that they will deter additional capital raises by bank holding
companies. A possible explanation for the Board not requiring an amendment to the
TPG-Washington Mutual agreement is that Washington Mutual is a thrift regulated
by the Office of Thrift Supervision whereas National City is a nationally chartered
bank.).
219. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(8)(B); 12 C.F.R. § 225.144.
220. See Colvin & Charan, supra note 14.
221. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.144; Mayer Brown, supra note 91.
222. Loan Rangers, supra note 18; David Enrich, Robin Sidel & Damian Paletta,
Fed May Give Private Equity More Leeway to Help Banks, WALL ST. J., June 27,
2008, at C1.
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made via separate funds.23 The "source of strength" requirement
is also overly burdensome and can be a liability on all of the other
portfolio holdings of a private equity firm. Being able to separate,
or "ring fence," a bank only fund from the other private equity
funds would ensure the safety of an investor's other holdings.
The requirements of the BHCA and CIBCA can only be
changed by Congress, but the Board has a great deal of leeway in
how it interprets the rules set forth.2  The Board exercised this
power with its 2008 Policy Statement. 25 The Policy Statement is
the Board's attempt to tap the large pools of capital that private
equity firms have ready to invest. Nonetheless, given the turmoil
in the market, the Board will be hesitant to allow private equity
firms any greater amount of freedom. Therefore, as the Board
continually monitors the regulations surrounding private equity
investment in banks, private equity firms interested in entering the
industry should be prepared to abide by the current regulations.226
Private equity firms should therefore look to structures such as:
acquiring a limited amount of voting stock and entering into
passivity agreements, acquiring non-voting stock, forming a
consortium of private equity investors, or creating special bank-
focused private equity funds.227
RAVI R. DESAI
223. Loan Rangers, supra note 18.
224. Enrich, Sidel & Paletta, supra note 222.
225. See supra Part II.D.
226. See supra Part II.
227. See supra Part III.
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